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Abstract 
This paper tries to contribute to the understanding of sovereign debt crises’ pattern by empirically 
investigating the determinants of the recent euro area crisis to assess if its transmission was due to 
“pure” or “fundamentals-based” contagion. Using sovereign bond yield spreads with respect to 
Germany for a sample of ten central and peripheral countries from January 1999 to December 
2012, we firstly examine the dynamic evolution of Granger-causality within the 90 pairs of yield 
spreads in our sample to detect episodes of contagion (associated with episodes of significant 
intensification in causality). Secondly, we make use of a logit model to explore whether there is 
evidence of “pure contagion” or “fundamentals-based contagion”, by trying to determine which 
factors might have been behind the detected contagion episodes. Our results suggest that contagion 
episodes are concentrated just after the inception of the EMU and matching the global financial 
crisis, yielding more accurate and sensible indicators than those obtained from DCC-GARCH 
models used in prior studies. Indeed, they preceded the outburst of the global financial crisis 
(causality intensification is detected from March 2008), and reached a peak during January-May 
2011. Furthermore, they underline the coexistence of “pure” and “fundamentals-based contagion” 
during the recent European debt crisis.  
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1. Introduction 
The announcement of Greece’s distressed debt position in late 2009 triggered a sudden loss 
of investor confidence and marked the beginning of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. 
Indeed, in May 2010 Greece’s financial problems became so severe that the country needed 
to be bailed out. An important reason for providing financial support to Greece was fear of 
contagion (see, e.g., Constâncio, 2012). This fear could be mainly explained by two facts: 
(1) several European Union (EU) banks had a high exposure to Greece (see Gómez-Puig 
and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2013); and (2) investors then turned their attention to the 
macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances within European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) countries. So, from late 2009 onwards, in parallel with the higher demand for the 
German bund which benefited from its safe haven status, yield spreads of euro area issues 
with respect to Germany spiralled (see Figure 1). Besides, since May 2010, not only has 
Greece been rescued three times, but also Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus needed bailouts to 
stay afloat.  
These events raised some important questions for economists, policymakers, and 
practitioners. To what extent was the sovereign risk premium increase in the euro area 
during the European sovereign debt crisis due only to deteriorated debt sustainability in 
member countries? Did contagion play any significant role in the increase in the sovereign 
risk premium? In fact, the sovereign debt crisis in Europe has rekindled the literature on 
contagion applied to the euro area [see Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012), Metiu (2012), 
Caporin et al. (2013), Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), Mink and Haan (2013), or Ludwig 
(2014) to name a few], even though the empirical evidence is not conclusive. The 
inconsistencies between studies using different empirical approaches and applying different 
definitions of the crisis transmission channel have made it difficult to compare results and 
therefore to reach meaningful conclusions (Dungey et al., 2005). The main objective of this 
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paper is to shed some light on this challenging avenue of research and to contribute to our 
understanding of the pattern we observe in sovereign debt crises. 
In this context, since the term contagion has not been used with accuracy in the literature 
(as it will be explained in Section 2.1, two main groups of theories have been used to 
explain contagion), nor is there any agreement on the econometric methodology to be used 
to quantify it, our first contribution is to provide an operational definition of the term 
“contagion”: an abnormal increase in the intensity of causal relationships. This definition 
will allow us to explore whether there is evidence of “fundamentals-based contagion” (if 
the abnormal increase can be explained by macroeconomic fundamentals, financial linkages 
or common regional/global shocks) or “pure contagion” (if it is only triggered by a shift in 
idiosyncratic market sentiments). The second contribution is an empirical one: contagion is 
an unobservable shock, and therefore most empirical techniques have problems dealing 
with latent variables. In this paper in order to tackle this issue, we first test for the existence 
of possible Granger-causal relationships between 10-year sovereign yield spreads over 
Germany of 10 EMU countries, both central (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and The 
Netherlands) and peripheral (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and, then, we 
examine the time-varying nature of these relationships in order to detect episodes of 
significant intensification in the causality between them1. Finally, the last and main 
contribution of the paper is the investigation of whether transmission of the recent crisis in 
euro area sovereign debt markets was due to pure or fundamentals-based contagion. To 
that end, we try to determine which factors (changes in local risk sentiment in each 
different country, fundamental variables, financial linkages, or common regional/global risk 
factors) might have been behind these intensification episodes.   
                                                          
1 As it is shown in Section 3.5, our methodology yields to more accurate and sensible indicators than those obtained from DCC-GARCH 
models used in prior studies.  
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on financial 
contagion and on the determinants of euro-area sovereign bond spreads. The Granger-
causality analysis and our approach for the detection of episodes of causality intensification 
(which we associate with contagion) are presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we carry out 
the empirical exploration of the determinants of these episodes. Finally, Section 5 
summarises the findings and offers some concluding remarks.  
2. Literature review  
2. 1. Financial contagion   
Considerable ambiguity surrounds the precise definition of contagion. There is no 
theoretical or empirical definition on which all researchers agree; therefore, the debate on 
exactly how to define contagion is not just academic, but has important implications for 
measuring the concept and for evaluating policy responses. Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) note 
five definitions of contagion used in the literature, whilst The World Bank defines three 
layers within contagion2. First, in a broad sense, contagion is the cross-country transmission 
of shocks; in this sense, contagion can take place both during “good” and “bad” times and 
does not need to be related to crises. Second, in a restrictive sense, contagion is the 
transmission of shocks to other countries, or the cross-country correlation, beyond any 
fundamental link3 between the countries and beyond common shocks. When either 
fundamentals or common shocks do not fully explain the relationship between countries, 
spillover effects are attributed to herding behaviour, either rational or irrational. Finally, in 
a very restrictive sense, according to the World Bank, contagion refers to increases in cross-
country correlations during “crisis times” relative to correlations during “tranquil times”.  
                                                          
2 http://go.worldbank.org/JIBDRK3YC0 
3 The World Bank distinguishes three different categories of fundamental links: financial, real, and political. The first ones exist when two 
economies are connected through the international financial system. Real links are fundamental economic relationships between 
countries. These links have usually been associated with international trade, but other types of real links, like foreign direct investment 
across countries, may also be present. Finally, political links are the political relationships between countries. Although this link is much 
less stressed in the literature, when a group of countries share an exchange rate arrangement – a common currency in the case of the euro 
area countries – crises tend to be clustered. 
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The second and third definitions of contagion proposed by the World Bank (contagion in a 
restrictive, and in a very restrictive sense) have predominantly been used in empirical 
studies analysing the concept in financial markets and have been adopted in common usage 
by governments, citizens and policymakers. The third defines contagion depending on 
whether the transmission mechanisms are stable through time, whilst the second defines it 
depending on the channels of transmission that are used to spread the effects of the crisis.  
According to the very restrictive definition, which was proposed in a seminal paper by 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002), contagion is a significant increase in cross-market linkages 
after a shock to one country (or group of countries). Therefore, if two markets show a high 
degree of co-movement during periods of stability, even if they continue to be highly 
correlated after a shock to one market this may not constitute contagion. This definition 
implies the presence of a tranquil, pre-crisis period4.  
By contrast, Masson (1999) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) explore the restrictive 
definition of contagion, arguing that contagion arises when common shocks and all 
channels of potential interconnection are either not present or have been controlled for. 
According to these authors, “pure or true contagion” should be distinguished from 
“fundamentals-based contagion” which is caused by “monsoonal effects” and “linkages”5. 
Conversely, the term “pure contagion” is only applied when the transmission process itself 
changes when entering crisis periods: when a crisis in one country may conceivably trigger 
a crisis elsewhere for reasons unexplained by macroeconomic fundamentals – perhaps 
because it leads to shifts in market sentiment, or changes the interpretation given to 
existing information, or triggers herding behaviour. Different mechanisms have been 
proposed to explain herding behaviour by international investors and other cases of 
                                                          
4 The distinction between contagion which occurs at times of crisis, and the interdependence which is the result of normal market 
interaction, has become the focal point of many contagion studies (see, e.g., Corsetti et al., 2005).  
5 “Monsoonal effects” are random aggregate shocks that hit a number of countries in a similar way (such as a major economic shift in 
industrial countries, a significant change in oil prices or changes in US interest rates) that may adversely affect the economic 
fundamentals of several economies simultaneously and, therefore, may cause a crisis. “Linkages” are normal interdependencies, such as 
those produced by trade and financial relations between countries and which can easily become a carrier of crisis.  
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extreme market sentiment (see Akerlof and Shiller, 2009), but asymmetric information is at 
the root of those reactions.  
All in all, then, the literature includes two groups of theories (not necessarily mutually 
exclusive – see Dungey and Gajurel, 2013) to explain crisis transmission mechanisms. One 
group argues that the economic fundamentals of different countries are interconnected by 
their cross-border flows of goods, services, and capital. When a crisis originates in one 
country, this interdependence of economies through real and financial linkages may 
become a conveyor of crisis. In addition, global phenomena or common shocks may 
adversely affect the economic fundamentals of several economies simultaneously, and may 
therefore cause a crisis. These fundamentals-based effects are also known as ‘spillovers’ 
(Masson, 1999), ‘interdependence’ (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), or ‘fundamentals-based 
contagion’ (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000).  
The other group of theories argues that financial crises spread from one country to another 
due to reasons not related to or explained by economic fundamentals, such as market 
imperfections of herding behaviour of international investors (Masson, 1999 or Mondria 
and Quintana-Domeque, 2013)6.  
The initial empirical literature on financial crisis and contagion was focused on 
fundamentals-based mechanisms and directed towards developing an early warning system 
(Eichengreen et al., 1996; Kaminsky and Reinahrt, 2000) while later empirical works have 
focused on investor behaviour-based mechanisms (Dungey et al., 2005; Bekaert et al., 2014). 
The aim of this paper is to explore the extent to which the transmission of euro area debt 
crisis could be attributed to common shocks and/or interconnected markets (through real 
and financial linkages), to idiosyncratic factors (shifts in market participants behaviour 
                                                          
6 A different story occurs when a crisis in one country could lead to a reassessment of objectively unchanged fundamentals in other 
countries. This is what Goldstein (1998) calls ‘wake-up call’ contagion since it leads market participants aware of existing problems or 
risks they failed to see before. Whilst some authors consider this sort of contagion a mechanism of ‘pure contagion’ propagation (Moser, 
2003), others (Beirne and Fraszter (2013) or Ludwig (2014)) identify it as ‘fundamentals-based’ contagion since it is the result of an 
efficient correction and leads towards a more accurate assessment of fundamentals.  
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during the crisis period), or to both types of factor. To this end, we will analyse which 
variables could be behind the crisis transmission in order to assess whether there is 
empirical evidence of “fundamentals-based contagion”, or “pure contagion”, or of a 
mixture of the two during the euro area sovereign debt crisis. 
In addition, among the five general strategies7 that have been used in the empirical 
literature, our analysis will be related to one of the most conventional methodologies for 
testing for contagion: the analysis of cross-market correlations. However, we not only 
investigate changes in cross-market interdependencies via cointegration analysis, but also 
explore changes in the existence and direction of pair-wise causal relationships among euro 
area sovereign bond yield spreads vis-à-vis the German bund8. Hence, the two operational 
definitions of contagion that we will explore in the remainder of this paper are the 
following. We will identify “fundamentals-based contagion” as an abnormal increase in the 
intensity of causal relationships explained by macroeconomic fundamentals, financial 
linkages or common regional/global shocks, and “pure contagion” as an abnormal increase 
in the intensity of causal relationships only triggered by a shift in idiosyncratic market 
sentiments.  
2.2. Determinants of the evolution of euro-area sovereign yield spreads. 
In order to analyse the factors behind episodes of intensification of causality within 
sovereign yield spreads, we focus on the literature on the determinants of the evolution of 
euro-area sovereign yield spreads. This literature, combined with that of financial 
contagion, suggests that we should not only include variables that measure macroeconomic 
fundamentals or some potential channels of crisis transmission, but also those that capture 
                                                          
7 Probability analysis, cross-market correlations, VAR models, latent factor/GARCH models, and extreme value/co-exceedance/jump 
approach (see Forbes, 2013). 
8 Forbes and Rigobon (2002) suggest the use of this methodology and note that, if the source of the crisis is not well identified and 
endogeneity may be severe, it may be useful to utilise Granger-causality tests to determine the extent of any feedback from each country 
in the sample to the initial crisis country. 
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changes in market sentiment: either idiosyncratic, regional, or global9. A summary with the 
definition and sources of all the explanatory variables used in our analysis is presented in 
Appendix A.  
Specifically, although pure contagion is the most difficult type of contagion to measure 
empirically as it partly reflects factors that are unobservable, we honestly think that it can 
be proxied using variables that capture market sentiment in each different country (see 
Appendix A1 to A3). To that end, following the literature, four variables have been used to 
gauge regional, global or local market sentiment in each country in our sample: stock 
returns, stock volatility, an index of economic policy uncertainty, and an index of the fiscal 
stance. Finally, the analysis of the influence of local, regional and global market sentiment 
on sovereign yield spreads’ linkages has been completed by the inclusion of one more 
variable in the first case (the credit rating), five additional variables in the second (two 
variables that capture credit quality in the corporate market, a variable that captures interest 
rate volatility and two variables that gauge EMU instability and default risk), and two 
supplementary variables in the third (and index of the global risk aversion and the Kansas 
city financial stress index).  
On the other hand, in order to measure the impact of fundamental variables (at both the 
local and the regional level) on sovereign spreads causal relationships, we use instruments 
that gauge not only each country’s fiscal position, but the market liquidity in each country, 
its foreign debt, its potential rate of growth, and the loss of competitiveness as well (see 
Appendix A4 and A5). Besides, the private sector level of indebtedness has been added in 
the analysis of the effect of local fundamental variables. 
Finally, according to certain authors (see Allen et al., 2011, among them), in a scenario of 
increased international financial activity in the euro area, not only are public finance 
imbalances key determinants of the probability that the sovereign crisis could spill over 
                                                          
9 We expect the same sign for the effect of each of these variables on spreads and on the occurrence of a contagion episode. 
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from one country to another, but its transmission through the banking system can also be a 
major issue. Consistently, in our analysis we also include variables that capture the 
important cross-border banking system linkages in euro area countries (see Appendix A6)10.  
All the variables included in the estimation that capture both macroeconomic fundamentals 
or financial linkages are in relative terms to the German ones, as our dependent variable is 
the difference between the 10-year sovereign yield of each country over Germany.  
3. Granger-causality analysis 
3. 1. Data  
The dependent variables in our empirical analysis are bond yield spreads, derived as 
differences between 10-year sovereign bond yields of EMU-founding countries and Greece 
and yields of the equivalent German bund. Therefore, our sample contains both central 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and the Netherlands) and peripheral countries (Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) 11. 
We use daily data from 1 January 1999 to 31 December 2012 collected from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream. The sample size is constrained by the availability of several 
explanatory variables used in the estimation of the logit model presented in Section 412.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the levels and differences of the bond yield 
spreads during the sample period. As can be seen, the mean is not significantly different 
from zero for the first differences. Normality is tested with the Jarque-Bera test (which is 
distributed as χ2(2) under the null) and strongly rejected for both the levels and first 
differences. Since rejection could be due to either excess of kurtosis or skewness, we report 
these statistics separately in Table 1. Given that the kurtosis of the normal distribution is 3, 
                                                          
10 The construction and evolution of sectoral private debt and foreign banks claims (by sector and by nationality of reporting banks) are 
explained in Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2013). 
11 Luxembourg is exempted from the present analysis, because of its very low level of outstanding sovereign bonds. 
12 Concretely, some of the instrumental variables used in the analysis have been constructed by other authors for a given period of time 
and kindly provided by them. Is the case of the index of the fiscal stance (Polito and Wickens, 2012); the interest rate volatility index 
(López and Navarro, 2013); the euro instability index (Klose and Weigert, 2012); and the euro area default risk (Lucas et al., 2013). This is 
the reason why the analysis ends in December 2012, since the above mentioned variables are not available beyond that date 
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our results suggest that the distribution of the levels of sovereign yield spreads, as well as all 
the first differences, are peaked relative to the normal. Finally, regarding the asymmetry of 
the distribution of the series around their mean, we find positive skewness for all the 
variables in levels and for the first difference in the case of Austria, Belgium, Finland, the 
Netherlands and Portugal, suggesting that their distributions have long right tails, whilst in 
the cases of the first differences of bond yield spreads for Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain 
there is evidence of negative skewness and therefore of distributions with long left tails. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Figure 1 plots the evolution of daily 10-year sovereign bond spreads for each country in 
our sample. A simple look at this figure indicates the differences in the yield behaviour 
before and after the outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis at the end of 2009.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Specifically, it is striking that between the introduction of the euro in January 1999 and 
November 2009, when it became clear that the Greek economy faced the bleak reality of 
being unable to finance its sovereign debt, spreads on bonds of EMU countries moved in a 
narrow range with only slight differentiation across countries. In fact, the stability and 
convergence of spreads was considered a hallmark of successful financial integration inside 
the euro area (neither the subprime crisis nor the Lehman Brothers collapse bit significantly 
into euro sovereign spreads). 
Nevertheless, once the Global Financial Crisis began to affect the real sector, the 
imbalances within euro area countries were plain to see. Spreads, which had reached levels 
close to zero between the launch of the euro and October 2009 (the average value of the 
10-year yield spread against the German bund moved between 10 and 47 basis points in the 
case of France and Greece respectively), have risen ever since. Indeed, the risk premium on 
EMU government bonds increased strongly from November 2009, reflecting investor 
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perceptions of upcoming risks. Figure 1 shows that by late 2011 and beginning 2012 it 
reached maximum levels of 4680 basis points in Greece, 1141 in Portugal, 1125 in Ireland, 
635 in Spain and 550 in Italy. This widespread increase in sovereign spreads meant that 
certain euro area Member States were under enormous pressure to finance their debt, and 
funding costs rose significantly. This led to an increase in rollover risk as debt had to be 
refinanced at unusually high costs and, in extreme cases, could not be rolled over at all, 
which triggered the need for a rescue (see Caceres et al., 2010).  
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix for the levels of the bond yield spreads to have a first 
description of the degree of relationship between the variables under study. As can be seen, 
our results suggest a fairly strong positive relationship between our sample of bond yield 
spreads, ranging the cross-correlation from 0.5392 (between Finland and Greece) to 0.9730 
(between Italy and Spain). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
3. 2. Econometric strategy 
The concept of Granger-causality was introduced by Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) and is 
widely used to ascertain the importance of the interaction between two series. The central 
notion is one of predictability (Hoover, 2001): a variable Y is said to Granger-cause another 
variable X if past values of Y help predict the current level of X better than past values of 
X alone, indicating that past values of Y have some informational content that is not 
present in past values of X. Therefore, knowledge of the evolution of the variable Y 
reduces the forecast errors of the variable X, suggesting that X does not evolve 
independently of Y.  
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Tests of Granger causality typically use the same lags for all variables. This poses a potential 
problem, since Granger-causality tests are sensitive to lag length13. In determining the 
optimal lag structure for each variable, we follow Hsiao’s (1981) sequential method to test 
for causality, which combines Akaike’s final predictive error (FPE, from now on) and the 
definition of Granger-causality14. Essentially, the FPE criterion trades off the bias that 
arises from under-parameterisation of a model against a loss in efficiency resulting from its 
over-parameterisation, removing the ambiguities of the conventional procedure.  
Consider the following models,  
 t 0
1
m
i t i t
i
X X  

                     (1) 
0
1 1
m n
t i t i j t j t
i j
X X Y    
 
                                      (2)       
where Xt and Yt  are stationary variables [i.e., they are I(0) variables]. The following steps 
are used to apply Hsiao’s procedure for testing Granger-causality: 
i) Treat Xt as a one-dimensional autoregressive process (1), and compute its FPE with 
the order of lags m varying from 1 to m15. Choose the order which yields the 
smallest FPE, say m, and denote the corresponding FPE as FPEX (m, 0). 
ii) Treat Xt as a controlled variable with m number of lags, and treat Yt as a 
manipulated variable as in (2). Compute again the FPE of (2) by varying the order 
of lags of Yt from 1 to n, and determine the order which gives the smallest FPE, say 
n, and denote the corresponding FPE as FPEX (m,n)
16. 
                                                          
13 The general principle is that smaller lag lengths have smaller variance but run a risk of bias, while larger lags reduce the bias problem 
but may lead to inefficiency. 
14 Thornton and Batten (1985) show that Akaike’s FPE criterion performs well relative to other statistical techniques. 
15 FPEX(m,0)  is computed using the formula: 1( ,0) · ,
1
X
T m SSR
FPE m
T m T
 

 
where T is the total number of observations and SSR is the 
sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (1) 
16 FPEX(m,n)  is computed using the formula: 1( , ) · ,
1
X
T m n SSR
FPE m n
T m n T
  

  
where T is the total number of observations and SSR is 
the sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (2) 
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iii) Compare FPEX (m, 0) with FPEX (m,n) [i.e., compare the smallest FPE in step (i) 
with the smallest FPE in step (ii)]. If FPEX (m,0) > FPEX (m,n), then Yt is said to 
cause Xt. If FPEX (m,0) < FPEX (m,n), then Xt is an independent process. 
iv) Repeat steps i) to iii) for the Yt variable, treating Xt as the manipulated variable. 
When Xt and Yt are not stationary variables, but are first-difference stationary [i.e., they are 
I(1) variables] and cointegrated (see Dolado et al., 1990), it is possible to investigate the 
existence of Granger-causal relationships from ∆Xt to ∆Yt and from ∆Yt to ∆Xt, using the 
following error correction models: 
0
1
m
t i t i t
i
X X  

                                      (3) 
        0 1
1 1
m n
t t i t i j t j t
i j
X Z X Y      
 
                  (4) 
where Zt is the OLS residual of the cointegrating regression ( t tX Y   ), known as the 
error-correction term. Note that, if Xt and Yt are I (1) variables, but they are not 
cointegrated, then β in (4) is assumed to be equal to zero. 
In both cases [i.e., Xt  and Yt  are I(1) variables, and they are or are not cointegrated], we can 
use Hsiao’s sequential procedure substituting Xt with ∆Xt and Yt with ∆Yt in steps i) to iv), 
as well as substituting expressions (1) and (2) with equations (3) and (4). Proceeding in this 
way, we ensure efficiency since the system is congruent and encompassing (Hendry and 
Mizon, 1999). 
3.3. Preliminary results 
As a first step, we tested the order of integration of the 10-year bond yields by means of 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. Then, following Cheung and Chinn (1997)’s 
suggestion, we confirmed the results using the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) (KPSS) tests, 
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where the null is a stationary process against the alternative of a unit root. The results, not 
shown here to save space but available from the authors upon request, decisively reject the 
null hypothesis of non-stationarity in the first regressions. They do not reject the null 
hypothesis of stationarity in first differences, but strongly reject it in levels, in the second 
ones. So, they suggest that both variables can be treated as first-difference stationary17. 
As a second step, we tested for cointegration between each of the 45 pair combinations18 of 
EMU yields using Johansen (1991, 1995)’s approach. The results suggest19 that only for the 
Greece-Ireland and Greece-Portugal cases does the trace test indicate the existence of one 
cointegrating equation at (at least) the 5% level. Therefore, for these two pairs we test for 
Granger-causality in first differences of the variables, with an error-correction term added 
[i. e., equations (3) and (4)], whereas for the remaining cases, we test for Granger-causality 
in first differences of the variables, with no error-correction term added [i. e., equations (3) 
and (4) with β=0] 
3.4. Empirical results 
The resulting FPE statistics for the whole sample suggest bidirectional Granger-causality in 
almost all cases20. However, there are some exceptions. We do not find unidirectional 
Granger-causality in the relationships running from Austria to Ireland, from Finland to 
France, from France to Ireland and from Greece to Ireland. Nor do we find bidirectional 
Granger-causality relationships between Austria and Portugal, or between Finland and 
Greece. However, in order to assess the dynamic Granger-causality between the 90 
                                                          
17 These results were confirmed using Phillips-Perron (1998) unit root tests controlling for serial correlation and the Elliott, Rothenberg, 
and Stock (1996) Point Optimal and Ng and Perron (2001) unit root tests for testing non-stationarity against the alternative of high 
persistence. These additional results are not shown here to save space, but they are available from the authors upon request.  
18 Recall that the number of possible pairs between our sample of ten EMU yield spreads with respect to Germany is given by the 
following formula ! 10!
45.
!( )! 2!(10 2)!
n
r n r
 
 
 
19 Again, the results are not presented in the interests of space, but are available from the authors upon request. 
20 These results are also available from the authors upon request. The results were confirmed using both Wald statistics to test the joint 
hypothesis 
1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ... 0n       in equations (2) or (4) and the Williams-Kloot test for forecasting accuracy (Williams, 1959).   
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possible EMU yield spreads relationships, we carried out 309,500 rolling regressions using a 
window of 200 observations21 (other authors, Azad et al., (2015) among them, combine the 
Granger causality with GARCH based estimates, to analyse the time-varying nature of the 
relationships). The rolling window method uses a fixed length moving window sequentially 
from the beginning to the end of the sample by adding one observation from ahead and 
dropping one from behind, where each rolling window subsample includes one 
observation22. In each estimation, we apply Hsiao (1981)’s sequential procedure outlined 
above to determine the optimum FPE (m, 0) and FPE (m, n) statistics in each case We find 
sub-periods of Granger-causality in all pair-wise relationships, even for those relationships 
where we found rejection when performing the tests for the whole sample. 
After examining the time-varying nature of causal relationships that allows us to detect 
dynamic investor behaviour in response to news and innovations, we proceed further by 
identifying sub-periods of significant increase in Granger-causality in order to explore the 
factors that may have been behind them. To this end, we identify episodes of Granger-
causality intensification such as those in which the time-varying Granger-causality indicator 
is greater than its 5% bootstrap critical values23. Therefore, we look for episodes where 
there is evidence of an enhancement in the information content of the yield spread series 
that significantly improves the explanatory power of the future evolution of the other yield 
spread series that will be associated with episodes of contagion24. 
                                                          
21 To the best of our knowledge, there is no statistical method to set the optimal window size; however there is a trade-off between the 
accuracy of the parameter estimates and the representativeness of the model over the subsample period. On one hand, a small window 
size reduces heterogeneity and improves the representativeness of parameters, but it may reduce parameter accuracy by increasing the 
standard errors of estimates. On the other hand, a large window size may improve the accuracy of estimates, but reduces the 
representativeness of the model. The chosen value of 200 observations is representative of the one used in practice and seems 
appropriate for our empirical application since it represents 6.36% of the sample. We have also used a value of 100 observations. The 
results (not shown here to save space but available from the authors upon request) render the same qualitative conclusions as when 200 
observations were used. 
22 Since the estimations are based only on the most recent portion of the data, our rolling window approach accommodates parameter 
variability and is robust to small samples and presence of multiple structural breaks and nonlinearities, providing evidence of existence or 
otherwise of temporal causal relationship (in-sample predictability over time) between the variables under study.  
23 We perform formal tests to evaluate whether the series have the same mean during the detected episodes and the rest of the 
observations. The results of these tests (not shown here, but available from the authors upon request) strongly reject the null hypothesis 
of equal mean across sub-samples, and provide additional support for the presence of increased Granger-causality. 
24 Using the framework for grading the strength of the Granger-causality relationship proposed by Atukeren (2005) we obtain the same 
classification of episodes of causality intensification. Atukeren (2005)’s framework uses Postkitt and Tremayne (1987)’s posterior odds 
ratio test and Jeffreys (1961)’s Bayesian concept of grades of evidence.  
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The graphs in Figures 2 suggest that these episodes are concentrated after the inception of 
the EMU in 1999-2000, and matching the Global Financial Crisis that began in October 
2008 with Lehman Brothers collapse. Specifically, Figures 2a to 2d represent the number of 
causality intensification episodes detected within peripheral countries (Figure 2a), from 
peripheral to central countries (Figure 2b), within central countries (Figure 2c), and from 
central to peripheral countries (Figure 2d). In general, the figures indicate that contagion 
episodes preceded the outburst of the Global Financial Crisis. Indeed, in most of the cases, 
causality intensification is detected from March 2008, and reached a peak in 2011. These 
results signal that our empirical strategy to detect contagion episodes provides some useful 
information about the examined countries’ vulnerability to crises. 
[Insert Figures 2 here] 
3.5. Alternative empirical results25 
In order to examine how our empirical results change when we adopt the methods used in 
prior studies that take into account the time-varying nature of the relationships, we follow 
previous contributions by Celik (2012), Lean and Tuan (2013), Azad et al. (2015) and Hou 
and Li (2016) and use Engle’s (2002) Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model. The 
time-varying correlation estimated from this model indicates market integration. Markets 
become more integrated when the conditional correlation increases over time (Yu et al., 
2010). This model is able to capture the volatility correlation between two markets, either 
directly through its conditional variance or indirectly through its conditional covariances. 
The model is also able to examine the volatility spillover from one market to another 
market, providing insight on both markets’ synchronization and volatility clustering in 
financial series. The DCC has two stages. In the first step, the GARCH parameters are 
                                                          
25 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis. 
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estimated. In the second step, the conditional correlations are estimated using the DCC 
method as follows: 
            Ht=DtRtDt          (5) 
 where Ht is a kxk conditional covariance matrix, Rt is the conditional correlation matrix, 
and Dt is diagonal matrix of time-varying standard deviations.  
The likelihood of the DCC estimator is: 
' 1
1
0.5 ( log(2 ) 2log( ) log( ) )
T
t t t t t
t
L k D R R  

     .  (6) 
The volatility (Dt ) and the correlation (Rt) components may vary, thus the estimation 
process is achieved in two steps.  
Firstly the volatility (Lv) is maximized: 
2 ' 2
1
0.5 ( log(2 ) log( ) )
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then the correlation (Lc) is maximized: 
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1
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L l R R   

       (8) 
Engle (2002) proposed a two-step estimation. The DCC model is estimated by a two-step 
procedure: a) in the first step univariate GARCH models are fitted for each assets’ returns 
and estimates of their variances are thus obtained; b) the returns are filtered out of the 
GARCH effect (degarched returns) by dividing by their estimated standard deviations and 
then are used to estimate the dynamics of correlation, / .it it itr h   In the second step, 
the standardized residuals are used to estimate the time-varying correlation matrix.  
The model developed by Engle (2002) has the following non-linear GARCH specification 
for the conditional correlation:  
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'
1 1 1(1 )t t t tQ a b Q a bQ            (9) 
where ,( )t ij tQ q  is a nxn symmetric positive definite matrix, a and b are nonnegative 
scalars such as a + b <1, a is the news coefficient and b is the decay coefficient. 
'( )t tQ E    is the unconditional variance matrix of the standardized residuals (the 
unconditional correlation). The conditional correlations ,ij tq are time-varying and follow a 
structure similar to a GARCH (1, 1) model.  
For ensuring a conditional correlation between -1 and +1, by normalization the correlation 
can be expressed , , . ./ .ij t ij t ii t jj tq q q   The correlations are obtained by transforming this 
to: 
0.5 0.5( ( ) ( ( )t t t tR diag Q Q diag Q
   
where 0.5( ( )tdiag Q is a diagonal matrix of the square root of the diagonal elements of .tQ  
Based on the estimated pair-wise dynamic conditional correlations, we associate episodes of 
contagion with monthly average values greater than 0.7, as an increase in conditional 
correlations can be signalling an intensification of the interdependence and a synchronised 
responses to shocks. Figures 3 report the results.   
[Insert Figures 3 here] 
A striking feature of these figures is that the resulting number of contagion episodes is 
quite jagged and they are not always higher during crisis times than during tranquil times.   
If we compare the contagion episodes detected using the dynamic Granger causality 
methodology (Figures 2) and the DCC-GARCH model (Figures 3), it can be observed that 
with the exception of the episodes detected from peripheral to central countries (where we 
find disagreement in 70% of the cases and agreement in only 30% of them), in the rest of 
the groups we can find either a concordance or a discrepancy in the contagion episodes 
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detected using one or the other methodology (the percentage is close to 50% in both 
cases). However, it is noticeable that in the four groups of relationships, around 30% of the 
disagreements represent underestimation of contagion by the DCC-GARCH model in 
times of crisis (from August 2009 till the second semester of 2012). It is clear from this 
analysis that our empirical strategy to identify contagion episodes yields more accurate 
indicators of the spread of market disturbances than the DCC-GARCH model might. 
Gaining a better understanding of the reasons for the observed differences in identifying 
contagion episodes depending on the applied methodology is an important task for future 
research. Meanwhile, recall that the main limitation of the standard DCC model is the 
assumption that the conditional correlations follow the same dynamic structure which 
might not be realistic in empirical work (Caporin and McAleer, 2013) in contrast to our 
econometric strategy where different dynamics may be assumed26. This limitation could 
account for the observed occurrences of false positives (results that indicate that a given 
condition is present when it actually is not) derived from the estimated DCC-GARCH 
models.  
3.6. A closer look at the empirical results 
Since our methodology to detect contagion episodes seems to present better performance, 
Figure 4 takes a closer look to the empirical results by plotting daily contagion episodes 
within all EMU countries using Granger-causality intensification jointly with the evolution 
of yield spreads.  
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
                                                          
26 Furthermore, if the data have structural breaks, the conditional correlation models may lead to incorrect estimation of the risk, while 
our econometric strategy can be used to detected structural breakpoints and to incorporate them into the analysis (Gómez-Puig and 
Sosvilla-Rivero, 2014). Also, the DCC model is limited to a small number of assets, while our econometric strategy can be generalised for 
a large number of assets.  
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It can be observed that during the Global Financial Crisis, contagion episodes detected 
within all EMU countries can be clustered into three phases27. The first phase, which can 
still be defined as a pre-crisis period, begins in March 2008 when, after a short respite 
following the takeover of Bear Stearns on 16 March 2008, financial asset prices came under 
renewed pressure and ends in March 2009. A distinctive feature of this period was an 
increased investor focus on signs that the US recession had spilled over to other major 
economies, triggering a synchronized economic downturn28. Besides, after Lehman 
Brothers collapse in mid-September 2008, the crisis was mainly marked by concerns about 
its repercussions, since the balance sheets of banks all around the globe indicated exposure 
to their assets. Therefore, policy action was implemented on an international scale as 
governments sought to support market functioning and to cushion the blow of rapid 
economic contraction. In the European context, the ECB announced liquidity to support 
European Banks29, while the European Commission adopted the European Recovery Plan 
and allowed governments to implement measures to bailout banks.  
The second phase covers the period September 2009-July 2010. At the beginning of this 
period, the newly elected Greek government announced that the country’s budget deficit 
was much larger than previously reported, marking the beginning of the sovereign debt 
crisis in Europe. Moreover, during this period, the first rescue package was put in place in 
Greece (May 2010) and fears that Greece’s debt crisis would spread to EMU peripheral 
countries were very strong.  
Finally, the third and deepest phase of contagion episodes started at the end of October 
2010 and ended in July 2012. This phase was a time of real turbulence in EMU sovereign 
debt markets since the crisis had already spread to other EMU countries and Ireland 
(November 2010) and Portugal (April 2011) also needed to be bailed out to stay afloat. In 
                                                          
27 Following the Bank for International Settlements, Singh et al. (2016) divide the Global Financial Crisis into eight different episodes 
and broadly explain the main events in each of them.  
28 Indeed, the euro area officially entered recession in the last quarter of 2008 when its GDP fell -2.1%. 
29 In September 2008 the Irish government already guaranteed all the deposits/debts of the country’s banks. 
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this context of financial distress and huge liquidity problems (we should recall that Italy was 
in the middle of a political crisis and that main rating agencies lowered the ratings not only 
of peripheral countries but of Austria and France as well), the European Central Bank 
responded forcefully by implementing (along with other central banks) nonstandard 
monetary policies, i.e., policies beyond setting the refinancing rate30. However, in March 
2012 the second rescue package to Greece was approved and in June 2012 Spain requested 
financial assistance to recapitalize its banking sector. This was the backdrop to the ECB’s 
President Mario Draghi’s statement that he would do “whatever it takes to preserve the 
euro”. So, the third phase finishes after that statement in July 2012, since from them the 
healing effects of Draghi’s words can be clearly observed in EMU sovereign debt markets.  
It is noticeable that during the third phase, when euro debt crisis was going through its 
worst time, contagion episodes registered an important increase compared to the other 
two, reaching their peak during January-May 2011. Therefore, results presented in Figure 4, 
that plots the time-evolution of these causality intensification episodes within all EMU 
countries jointly with yield spreads evolution, not only provide evidence of the “forward 
looking” nature of our indicator of contagion (it precedes the crisis outbreak), but also of a 
reinforcement in the interconnection between debt markets during times of huge distress. 
Indeed, the first phase of contagion episodes (2008:03-2009:03) leads the start of a number 
of successive increases in yield spreads, being these increases higher, the higher is the 
number of episodes detected. This feature is related to the fact that our methodology is 
based on predictability and could be capturing the changing market participants’ 
expectations and mood. Finally, it is also notable that, in times of crisis, contagion episodes 
are more frequent when the triggering countries in the causal relationships are peripheral 
(57% of the total, see Figures 2a and 2b) rather than central.  
                                                          
30 In particular, the ECB’s principal means of intervention were the so-called long term refinancing operations (LTRO). In November 
2011 and March 2012, the ECB allotted to banks an amount close to 500 billion Euros for a three-year period. 
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4. Determinants of episodes of Granger-causality intensification 
4.1. Econometric methodology  
Once the episodes of causality intensification have been detected based in our empirical 
strategy, we use logit models to analyse their determinants. We define a new dependent 
variable (
ity ) that takes the value one if we have detected such episode and zero otherwise. 
The goal is to quantify the relationship between a set of instruments (xit) characterizing the 
two countries involved in an episode of Granger-causality intensification and the 
probability of occurrence of such event (
ity ).  
To this end, we adopt a specification designed to handle the particular requirements of 
binary dependent variables. Suppose that we model the probability of observing a value of 
one as: 
                  Pr (
ity = 1| xit, β) = 1 – 
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which is based upon the cumulative distribution function for the logistic distribution. 
In order to establish the relevant determinants of the episodes of the Granger causality 
intensification, we employ a data-based method for obtaining parsimony representation of 
the data generation process: the general-to-specific approach (Hendry, 1995).  General-to-
specific modelling seeks to mimic reduction by commencing from a general congruent 
specification that is simplified to a minimal representation consistent with the desired 
criteria and the data evidence. Starting from a general congruent model that contains all the 
effects likely to be relevant (see Appendix A), standard testing procedures eliminate 
statistically-insignificant variables, with diagnostic tests checking the validity of reductions, 
ensuring a congruent final selection that renders a parsimonious and interpretable 
econometric model. 
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4.2. Empirical evidence 
Given that the instruments used as independent variables have been constructed with a 
monthly frequency, we also need to compute the dependent variable in the logit models on 
a monthly basis. We calculate the monthly data by assigning a value of 1 if at least for half 
of the month there is evidence of intensification in the interconnection between yield 
spreads, and a value of 0 otherwise.  
As mentioned before, our empirical analysis starts with a general unrestricted statistical 
model including all explanatory variables to capture the essential characteristics of the 
underlying dataset, testing it down by eliminating statistically insignificant variables, and 
checking the validity of the reductions at each stage to ensure congruence of the finally 
selected model31. We have also considered the possibility of both individual-specific effects 
(in each pair-wise relationship) and time-specific effects, by incorporating dummy variables, 
testing the joint significance of these dummies separately and once they are taken together. 
In Table 3 we report the final results of the logit models estimated by maximum likelihood 
for five groups of countries: the first correspond to causal relationship intensification 
episodes within pairs of all EMU countries, the second within pairs of peripheral countries, 
the third from peripheral to central countries, the fourth within central countries, and lastly, 
the fifth from central to peripheral countries32. The z-statistics in that table are based on 
robust standard errors computed using the Huber-White quasi-maximum likelihood 
method. As can be seen, all the estimated coefficients shown in Table 3 are significant at 
the 1% level, and the individual and time dummies are jointly significant for the 
relationships from peripheral to central countries, and in those between central countries, 
                                                          
31 Note that this commonly used approach is a process driven by the data. We have also explored the possibility of adopting an 
alternative theory-driven approach using a specific-to-general modeling process by estimating equation (5) with each potential category of 
determinants having only one representative variable, leading to a multiplicity of models by the successive incorporation of additional 
variables. Interestingly, this alternative approach that explicitly acknowledges that there may be several models that are generated by the 
same data set (Hendry, 1995) renders final specifications that are very close to the one obtained from the general-to-specific approach, 
giving further support to our results.  
32 The results are very similar for Probit models run on the same data. 
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while in the other three cases we only find that the individual dummies are statistically 
significant. 
The sign of the regression parameters can be immediately interpreted as determining 
whether the latent variable increases with the regressor. As can be seen, most of the 
estimated coefficients are positive, suggesting that an increase in the variable necessarily 
increases the probability of being in the contagion category (
ity =1). The converse is true 
for the negative sign coefficients associated with the consumer confidence indicator, the 
net position towards the rest of the world, and the market liquidity33. 
In binary models, estimated coefficients cannot be interpreted as the marginal effect on the 
dependent variable. Therefore, to gain further insights in the influence of the explanatory 
variables, in Table 3 we also show the associated marginal effects to compare their relative 
impacts. These marginal effects measure the influence of a unit change in a given 
explanatory variable on the probability of pair-wise Granger-causality intensification, 
holding all the other variables constant and, following Bartus (2005) have been computed 
at their average values34. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
The empirical evidence presented in Table 3 does not support the occurrence of either 
“fundamentals-based” or “pure” contagion in euro area countries, but it suggests that a 
mixture of the two might have taken place. Specifically, when examining all pair-wise 
relationships (see column 1), we find that not only some of the variables which capture 
both local and regional market sentiment are statistically significant, but that some local 
                                                          
33 Recall that an increase in consumer confidence may lead to a rise in investor confidence, so it seems reasonable to expect a negative 
relationship between it and the probability of occurrence of a contagion episode. Regarding the current-account-balance-to-GDP ratio, 
which is the instrument used as a proxy of the net position of the country towards the rest of the world, since this variable is defined as 
the difference between exports and imports, an increase would have a negative effect on the probability of contagion. Finally, given that 
our measure of market liquidity is the overall amount of outstanding debt and that liquidity premium decreases with market size, one 
would expect a negative impact between this variable and contagion.  
34 Nevertheless, the direction of the effect of a change in any instrument depends only on the sign of the coefficient estimated: positive 
values imply that an increase in a given instrument will raise the probability of an increase in pair-wise Granger causality, while negative 
values indicate the opposite.  
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macroeconomic variables together with the instrument which gauges financial linkages are 
also relevant.   
These findings qualify and improve previous evidence presented in the literature. Dungey 
and Gajurel (2014) state that the two types of contagion are not necessary mutually 
exclusive; Ludwig (2014) points out that “pure” contagion effects are likely to be overstated 
when changes in common risk factors are not controlled for; Philippas and Siriopoulos 
(2013) point out that international portfolios pay attention to cross-market correlation 
dynamics within the Eurozone, based not only on their excess macroeconomic and fiscal 
performances but also driven by behavioural reasons; Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) 
find a marked shift in market pricing behaviour from a pre-crisis ‘convergence-trade’ model 
before August 2007 to one driven by both macro-fundamentals and international risk 
thereafter; whilst Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), who identify “fundamental-based 
contagion” with a reassessment of fundamentals in times of crisis, document that the prime 
explanation for the sharp sovereign risk increase during the EU debt crisis was due to 
fundamental rather than to pure contagion (unlike them, in this paper we follow Goldstein 
(1998) or Masson (1999) and consider sudden shifts in market confidence and/or 
expectations that may lead to a reconsideration of unchanged fundamentals as important 
factors causing “pure contagion”35). 
Indeed, recent European events have encouraged a new discussion of contagion. 
Differently from previous crises, in which the country responsible for spreading the shock 
was relatively clear, in the euro area sovereign debt crisis several peripheral countries 
entered a fiscal crisis at roughly the same time. Actually, when a group of countries share 
an exchange rate agreement (a common currency in the case of the euro area countries), 
crises tend to be clustered. It seems reasonable that, since the economic fundamentals of 
EMU countries are interconnected by their cross-border flows of goods, services, and 
                                                          
35 See Section 2.1 
  
26 
capital, other variables beyond herding behaviour or sudden shifts in market confidence 
might also be at the origin of crisis propagation.  
Nevertheless, we observe some disparities when analysing crisis transmission from the 
different groups of countries, peripheral or central. In particular, it can be observed that the 
nearest that crisis transmission is to the definition of “pure contagion” is when the causal 
relationship is from peripheral to central countries. In this case, local market sentiment’s 
variables represent 40% of the drivers of an abnormal increase in the intensity of causal 
relationships (see column 3). However, it is noticeable that, in all the cases, crisis 
transmission seems to be explained by idiosyncratic variables (either market sentiment or 
fundamental, who account for more than 75% of the total significant variables) rather than 
by shifts in common regional variables.  
Looking across the columns36, we see that, with regard to the variables measuring local 
market sentiment, we find a positive and significant effect for the stock-market volatility, 
the index of the fiscal stance and the credit rating (as expected, the consumer confidence 
indicator presents a negative sign). Notice that the marginal effects of the variable 
capturing the fiscal stance are much higher than those associated with other local market 
sentiment variables. As for the local macrofundamentals, our results suggest a negative 
impact on contagion for both the net position towards the rest of the world and the market 
liquidity variable, and a positive effect for the country growth potential (proxied by the 
unemployment rate), the competitiveness (captured by the inflation rate) and the fiscal 
position (measured by the debt/GDP or the deficit/GDP ratios). The estimated marginal 
effect of the domestic inflation rate is particularly high in the relationships where central 
countries are the triggers and in the relationships from peripheral to central countries. In 
relation to indicators of regional market sentiment, we detect that the credit spread in 
                                                          
36 We summarize the results by pointing out the main regularities. The reader is asked to browse through Table 3 to find evidence for a 
particular group of countries of her/his special interest. 
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European corporate bond market plays a decisive role in contagion episodes within either 
peripheral or central countries, while the European 5-year CDS index in the non-financial 
sectors (ITRAXXNF) is especially relevant when examining relationships when central 
countries are the triggers. The variable euro instability which reflects the market 
expectation of the probability that at least one euro area country would have left the 
currency union at the end of 2013 is found to be positive and statistically significant in all 
cases, showing higher marginal effects than those associated with other regional market 
sentiment variables. As regards the potential role of financial linkages in the contagion 
episodes, we find a significant effect for the variable measuring cross-border banking 
linkages when analysing the whole sample, and the causal relationships from peripheral to 
central countries, supporting the close interconnection between the banking and the 
sovereign sectors. Nevertheless, it should be noticed that the marginal effect of this last 
variable is very small. 
Interestingly, none of variables measuring global market sentiment or regional 
macroeconomic variables was found to be statistically significant. With respect to the latter 
result, the fact that the dependent variable used in the analysis is the yield spread over the 
German bund might have cancelled out all common regional macroeconomic effects that 
might have adversely affected the economic fundamentals of several economies 
simultaneously, since they may have been captured by the evolution of the German yield. 
As for the global market sentiment, the result suggests that shifts in local or regional rather 
than global market sentiment are behind euro area debt crisis transmission. These results 
are in line with Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2014) who explore the breakpoints in 
EMU yield evolution and find that not only are half of the breakpoints directly connected 
to the euro sovereign debt crisis, but that 63% of them occur after November 2009 (once 
Papandreou’s government announced the Greece’s distressed  debt position). Additionally, 
the absence of global market sentiment in the final regressions could also suggest that 
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EMU has effectively acted as a true system, in which common conditions have had priority 
over global ones, and where only real differences (at least as perceived by market 
participants) could have explained the dissimilar evolution in sovereign yield spreads.  
Finally, in Table 3 we also report the McFadden pseudo-R2 statistic as a measure of 
goodness of the fit. As can be seen, it ranges from 0.3535 to 0.4096, suggesting the relative 
success of the estimated logit regression models in predicting the values of the dependent 
variable within the sample when set against previous work with these models. Note that χ2 
and log likelihood diagnostic statistics are also satisfactory. As a further test to evaluate 
how well our estimated models account for the observations, in Table 3 we also present the 
proportion of outcomes correctly predicted by the estimated models, denoted as Count R2. 
As can be seen, it ranges from 0.6552 to 0.7779, which can be considered a fairly good 
result.   
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have empirically investigated whether the transmission of the recent crisis 
in euro area sovereign debt markets was due to pure or fundamentals-based contagion. To 
this end, we have examined the behaviour of EMU sovereign bond yield spreads with 
respect to the German bund for a sample of both central (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France and the Netherlands) and peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain) from January 1999 to December 2012. 
Using daily data, we first adopted an eclectic approximation and applied a dynamic 
approach to analyse the evolution of the degree of Granger-causality within the 90 pairs of 
sovereign bond yield spreads in our sample. We aimed to detect episodes of significantly 
increased causality between them to capture the strength of transmission, which we 
associate with contagion. As in every empirical analysis, the results must be taken with 
caution since they are based on a set of countries over a certain period and on a given 
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econometric methodology. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that these episodes are 
concentrated just after the inception of the EMU in 1999-2000, and matching the Global 
Financial Crisis (an important peak is reached in 2011). Moreover, our identified contagion 
episodes preceded the outburst of the crisis since they are detected from March 2008. This 
feature is related to the fact that our methodology is based on predictability and could be 
capturing the changing market participants’ expectations and mood, becoming a good 
forward-looking predictor of the euro debt crisis unfolding. Compared to previous work 
that focused only DCC-GARCH models, this new methodology identifies substantially 
different contagion episodes, yielding more accurate and sensible indicators of the 
spread of market disturbances. 
We then used a logit model with monthly data to assess whether a set of variables proposed 
in the theoretical and empirical literature measuring market sentiment (either global, 
regional and local), as well as macrofundamentals (both regional and local) and financial 
linkages have a significant influence in the occurrence of the detected episodes. The 
findings underline the importance of both variables proxying market sentiment and 
macrofundamentals in determining contagion outcomes. Therefore, sovereign risk 
premium increase in the euro area during the European sovereign crisis was not due only 
to deteriorated debt sustainability in member countries; nor can it be explained only by 
herding behaviour or sudden shifts in market confidence and expectations. Nevertheless, 
our analysis highlights the relative importance of market participants’ perceptions in 
contagion episodes from peripheral to central countries. We think that our empirical 
evidence supporting that both types of contagion took place during the European 
sovereign debt crisis is sensitive, since the sudden loss of market confidence, brought about 
by the financial crisis, might have enlarged the effects of deteriorated fundamentals over 
yield spreads. 
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We consider that our results may have some practical implications for investors and 
policymakers regarding hedging and investing behaviour and choices, and may provide 
theoretical insights for academic scholars interested in the behaviour of sovereign debt 
markets and for those scholars interested in asset international pricing models. 
Additionally, our methodology can be used as a tool to provide information regarding the 
factors underlying crisis transmission and related risks, helping to design appropriate 
policies in advance for avoiding any impending crisis. 
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Appendix A: Definition of the explanatory variables in the logistic regressions and 
data sources 
 
A.1. Variables that measure local market sentiment. 
Variable Description Source 
 
Stock Returns 
Differences of logged stock indices prices of the last and the 
first day of the month for each country. 
 
Datastream 
 
Stock Volatility 
Monthly standard deviation of the daily returns of each 
country’s stock market general index 
 
Datastream 
Index of Economic Policy Uncertainty 
(Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) 
This index draws on the frequency of newspaper references to 
policy uncertainty and was created by Baker et al., 2013. 
 
www.policyuncertainty.com 
 
 
 
Index of the Fiscal stance 
 
This indicator compares a target level of the debt-GDP ratio at 
a given point in the future with a forecast based on the 
government budget constraint.  It was created by Polito and 
Wickens (2011, 2012). Monthly data were linearly interpolated 
from yearly observations for the available data: 1999-2011 
 
 
 
Provided by the authors.  
 
Consumer Confidence Indicator 
  
This index is built up by the European Commission which 
conducts regular harmonised surveys to consumers in each 
country. 
 
European Commission (DG 
ECFIN) 
 
Rating 
Credit rating scale built up from Fitch, Moody’s, S&P ratings 
for each country.  
 
Bloomberg 
A.2. Variables that measure regional market sentiment. 
Variable Description Source 
 
Stock Returns 
Differences of logged stock indices (Eurostoxx-50) prices of 
the last and the first day of the month for each country. 
 
Yahoo-finance 
Stock Volatility (VSTOXX) Eurostoxx-50 implied stock market volatility index. Monthly 
average of daily data. 
 www.stoxx.com 
 
Index of Economic Policy Uncertainty 
(Europe) 
Baker et al., 2013. www.policyuncertainty.com 
 
Index of the Fiscal stance 
(Europe)  
Polito and Wickens (2011, 2012). Monthly data were linearly 
interpolated from yearly observations for the available data: 
1999-2011.  
 
Provided by the authors.  
Consumer Confidence Indicator 
(Eurozone)  
European Commission  European Commission (DG 
ECFIN) 
 
 
Credit Spread 
Difference between the yields of the iBoxx indices 
containing BBB-rated European corporate bonds against the 
yields of the respective iBoxx index of AAA-rated European 
corporate bonds. Monthly average of daily data. 
 
 
Datastream 
 
ITRAXXFIN   
ITRAXXNF 
European 5-year CDS index in the financial and non-
financial sectors: 2010:9-2012:12. 
Monthly average of daily data. 
 
Bloomberg 
 
EIRVIX-1Y 
EIRVIX-10Y 
1-year and 10-year interest rate volatility index for the 
Eurozone based on the implied volatility quotes of caps 
(floors). This index was created by López and Navarro 
(2013) for the period 2004:1-2012:4. 
 
 
Provided by the authors. 
 
 
Euro Instability 
Market expectation of the probability that at least one Euro 
area country will have left the currency union at the end of 
2013, built up by Klose and Weigert (2012) for the period 
2010:8-2012:8. Monthly average of daily data. 
 
 
Provided by the authors. 
 
Euro area default risk 
Probability of two or more credit events, calculated by Lucas 
et. al. (2013): 2008:1-2012:12 
 
Provided by the authors. 
A.3. Variables that measure global market sentiment. 
Variable Description Source 
Stock Returns Differences of logged stock indices (S&P 500) prices of 
the last and the first day of the month. 
 
Datastream 
 
Stock Volatility (VIX) 
Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility 
Index. (Implied volatility of S&P 500 index options), 
Monthly average of daily data.  
 
Yahoo-Finance 
Index of Economic Policy Uncertainty 
(United States) 
Baker et al., 2013. www.policyuncertainty.com 
 
Index of the Fiscal stance 
(United States)  
Polito and Wickens (2011, 2012). Monthly data were 
linearly interpolated from yearly observations for the 
available data: 1999-2011 
 
Provided by the authors.  
 
Global Risk Aversion 
The spread between 10-year fixed interest rates on US 
swaps and the yield on 10-year Moody’s Seasoned AAA 
US corporate bonds. Monthly average of daily data. 
 
Datastream 
 
Kansas City Financial Stress Index 
This measure is based on 11 financial market variables, 
each of which captures one or more key features of 
financial stress. It was created by Hakkio and Keeton 
(2009) 
 
http://www.kansascityfed.org 
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A.4. Variables that measure local macrofundamentals. 
Variable Description Source 
Net position vis-à-vis 
the rest of the world  
Current-account-balance-to-GDP 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations. 
 
OECD 
Growth potential Unemployment rate  Eurostat 
Competitiveness Inflation rate. HICP monthly interannual rate of growth Eurostat  
 
Fiscal Position 
 
Government deficit-to-GDP and Government debt-to-GDP. 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations. 
 
Eurostat  
 
Market liquidity 
 
Domestic Debt Securities. Public Sector Amounts Outstanding 
(billions of US dollars) 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations.  
 
BIS Debt securities statistics. Table 18  
 
 
Bank’s debt  
Banks’ debt-to-GDP.  
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations for the GDP. 
ECB’s Monetary Financial Institutions 
balance sheets and own estimates. 
GDP has been obtained from Eurostat  
 
Non-financial 
corporation’s debt  
Non-financial corporations’ debt-to-GDP. 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations for the GDP. 
ECB’s Monetary Financial Institutions 
balance sheets and own estimates. 
GDP has been obtained from Eurostat 
 
Household’s debt 
Households’ debt-to-GDP of country. 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations for the GDP. 
ECB’s Monetary Financial Institutions 
balance sheets and own estimates. 
GDP has been obtained from Eurostat 
A.5. Variables that measure regional macrofundamentals. 
Variable Description Source 
Net position vis-à-vis  
the rest of the world.  
Current-account-balance-to-GDP 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations. 
 
OECD 
Growth potential Unemployment rate  Eurostat 
Competitiveness Inflation rate. HICP monthly interannual rate of growth Eurostat  
 
Fiscal Position 
Government deficit-to-GDP and Government debt-to-GDP. 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations. 
 
Eurostat  
 
Market liquidity 
Domestic Debt Securities. Public Sector Amounts Outstanding 
(billions of US dollars) 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations.  
 
BIS Debt securities statistics. Table 18  
 
A.6. Variables that measure financial linkages.  
Variable Description Source 
 
Foreign claims on bank debt 
Foreign bank claims on banks debt-to-GDP.  
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations.  
BIS Consolidated banking statistics. Table 
9C. GDP has been obtained from the 
OECD.  
 
Foreign claims on public  debt  
Foreign bank claims on government debt-to-GDP. 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations. 
BIS Consolidated banking statistics. Table 
9C. GDP has been obtained from the 
OECD  
Foreign claims on non-financial 
private debt.  
Foreign bank claims on non-financial private debt-
to-GDP. Monthly data are linearly interpolated from 
quarterly observations.  
BIS Consolidated banking statistics. Table 
9C. GDP has been obtained from the 
OECD.   
Cross-border banking linkages 
 
Percentage of the total foreign claims on country 
XX held by country YY's banks  
BIS Consolidated banking statistics. Table 
9D and own estimates. 
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         Figure 1. Daily 10-year sovereign yield spreads over Germany: 1999-2012 
 
Source: Datastream 
Note: Percentage points. 
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  Figures 2: Contagion episodes: Dynamic Granger-causality methodology        
  Figure 2a: Within peripheral countries                                                                                   Figure 2b: From peripheral to central countries             
                                                
 
           Figure 2c: Within central countries                                                                                        Figure 2d: From central to peripheral countries 
                                               
 
Source: Own estimates. Note: Number of contagion episodes detected 
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      Figures 3: Contagion episodes: DCC-GARCH model        
      Figure 3a: Within peripheral countries                                                                           Figure 3b: From peripheral to central countries             
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Figure 4: Contagion episodes within all EMU countries 
  
Phase 1:
2008:03-
2009:03
Phase 2:
2009:09-
2010:07
Phase 3:
2010:10-
2012:07
 
 
Source: Datastream and own estimates. 
Note: Number of contagion episodes detected and daily 10-year sovereign yield spreads over Germany in 
percentage points jointly with the three phases were contagion episodes are clustered matching the Global 
Financial Crisis. 
  
40 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Panel A: Levels 
AUS BEL FIN FRA GRE IRE ITA NET POR SPA
 Mean 0.2646 0.4347 0.1579 0.2230 3.8092 1.2131 0.8252 0.1637 1.5721 0.7712
 Median 0.1930 0.2681 0.1761 0.1110 0.4613 0.1616 0.2941 0.1332 0.2961 0.2324
 Maximum 1.8320 3.6600 0.8270 1.8870 46.8020 11.2490 5.4980 0.8420 14.4100 6.3540
 Minimum -0.1358 -0.1063 -0.1999 -0.1126 0.0693 -0.2368 0.0610 -0.1338 -0.1792 -0.0593
 Std. Dev. 0.2908 0.5397 0.1749 0.2997 7.5759 2.1266 1.1469 0.1568 2.9383 1.2850
 Skewness 1.6601 2.1728 0.5639 2.3132 2.6795 1.8265 2.2122 1.3250 2.2040 2.0911
 Kurtosis 6.0358 8.0628 3.2806 8.5844 9.9743 5.3234 6.9352 4.6350 6.6202 6.4360
 Jarque-Bera 3080 6774 206 8002 11565 2852 5335 1475 4951 4458
 Observations 3652 3652 3652 3652 3588 3652 3652 3652 3652 3652  
 
Panel B: First differences 
DAUS DBEL DFIN DFRA DGRE DIRE DITA DNET DPOR DSPA
 Mean 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0023 0.0009 0.0008 0.0000 0.0014 0.0010
 Median -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 Maximum 0.2420 0.3240 0.2514 0.2720 7.0300 0.8230 0.5950 0.1631 1.7590 0.4300
 Minimum -0.2820 -0.2930 -0.1537 -0.2870 -27.4460 -1.2127 -0.7750 -0.1815 -1.6546 -0.8180
 Std. Dev. 0.0242 0.0351 0.0186 0.0305 0.5257 0.0740 0.0579 0.0219 0.1036 0.0577
 Skewness 0.6113 0.2052 1.3143 -0.0673 -39.0312 -1.0836 -0.7882 0.1401 1.0218 -1.2964
 Kurtosis 25.5464 21.4015 28.4202 19.0731 2086.1580 48.7009 37.5478 15.4119 74.8098 33.7279
 Jarque-Bera 77559 51538 99352 39303 649000000 318439 181947 23447 785091 144659
 Observations 3651 3651 3651 3651 3587 3651 3651 3651 3651 3651
 Note: AUS, BEL, FIN, FRA, GRE, IRE, ITA, NET, POR and SPA stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
AUS BEL FIN FRA GRE IRE ITA NET POR SPA
AUS 1.0000
BEL 0.9018 1.0000
FIN 0.8941 0.7644 1.0000
FRA 0.8992 0.9518 0.7252 1.0000
GRE 0.7457 0.8971 0.5392 0.9137 1.0000
IRE 0.7306 0.8884 0.6281 0.8118 0.8314 1.0000
ITA 0.8028 0.9274 0.6097 0.9518 0.9467 0.8482 1.0000 0.7039
NET 0.9060 0.7963 0.8987 0.7950 0.5834 0.6713 0.7039 1.0000
POR 0.7494 0.9199 0.5700 0.9114 0.9635 0.9074 0.9541 0.6272 1.0000
SPA 0.7305 0.8754 0.5619 0.9035 0.9121 0.8679 0.9730 0.6616 0.9381 1.0000  
Note: AUS, BEL, FIN, FRA, GRE, IRE, ITA, NET, POR and SPA stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
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Table 3: Logit models 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
All  
Countries 
Peripheral  
Countries 
Peripheral- 
Central 
Countries   
Central 
Countries    
Central-
Peripheral  
countries   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Local market  
sentiment 
 
 
Stock Volatility 
XXStockVol - - -  0.2680* 
(3.3077) 
[0.0346] 
 YYStockVol 0.0157* 
(4.2523) 
[0.0030] 
 
- 0.0080* 
(3.0451) 
[0.0009] 
-  
 
Index of the 
Fiscal stance 
XXIFS - 17.4396* 
(5.7115) 
[1.4616] 
4.1177* 
(3.5417) 
 [0.4751] 
-  
YYIFS 3.5457* 
(7.9216) 
[0.6753] 
 
1.7466* 
(7.7230) 
 [0.1464] 
- -  
Consumer 
Confidence 
Indicator 
XXCCI - - -0.0163* 
(-3.4371) 
[-0.0019] 
- 
 
 
 
-0 .2620* 
(-3.4511) 
[-0.0338] 
YYCCI -0. 0229* 
(-3.8419) 
[-0.0044] 
 
- -0.0685* 
(-4.3512) 
[-0.0079] 
0.0178* 
(3.8421) 
[0.0019] 
-0.1577 
(-4.3410) 
[-0.0204]] 
 
Rating 
 
XXRating 0.0769* 
(7.6320) 
[0.0146] 
 
- 0.4157* 
(7.1308) 
[0.0537] 
 
2.9916* 
(4.1555) 
[0.3180] 
 
 
0.4157* 
(3.7348) 
 [0.0537] 
YYRating 0.0270* 
(3.9255) 
[0.0051] 
 
- 0.2202* 
(3.6813) 
[0.0285] 
 
- 0.2202* 
(3.6807) 
 [0.0285] 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Local macro 
fundamentals 
 
Net position 
towards  
the rest of the 
world 
XXCA -0.0648* 
(3.9813) 
[-0.0123] 
 
-  
 
- 
-0 .5089* 
(-3.9809) 
[-0.0541] 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
Growth potential 
XXU 0.1199* 
(7.8508) 
[0.0228] 
 
- 1.5410* 
(7.3517) 
[0.1106] 
 
1.1715* 
(3.8731) 
[0.1245] 
 
0.8551* 
(3.6722) 
[0.1105] 
 
 
 
 
YYU 0.1202* 
(6.3508) 
[0.0229] 
0.7273* 
(4.1905) 
 [0.0601] 
- 1.6867* 
(3.6499) 
[0.1793] 
 
- 
 
Competitiveness 
XXINF 0.2862* 
(3.8943) 
[0.0545] 
 
- 1.5410* 
(3.9345) 
[0.1991] 
 
2.0884* 
(4.3445) 
[0.2220] 
 
-1.5410* 
(3.3371 
[0.1991] 
 
 
 
 
  
YYINF 0.6057* 
(5.1983) 
[0.1154] 
 
0.9125* 
(7.3321) 
 [0.0765] 
1 .9076* 
(3.7514) 
 [0.2465] 
- 1.9076* 
(3.7552) 
[0.2465] 
 
 
Fiscal Position 
XXDEBT 0.0155* 
(2.8754) 
[0.0035] 
 
- 0.0880* 
(3.8184) 
 [0.0114] 
0.2513* 
(3.85612) 
[0.0267] 
 
0.0880* 
(3.1337) 
[0.0114] 
YYDEBT 0.0133* 
(2.9143) 
[0.0026] 
 
 
0.1673* 
(5.4604) 
 [0.0140] 
0.1658* 
(5.0901) 
[0.0214] 
- 0.2658* 
(5-0911) 
[0.0214] 
YYDEF  - - - 0.0807* 
(3.8378) 
[0.0104] 
Market liquidity 
 
XXLIQ - -0.0050* 
(-5.3712) 
[-0.0004] 
- -0 .0023* 
(-3.6382) 
[-0.0005] 
 
-0.0051 
(-5.1827) 
[-0.0007] 
YYLIQ  - -0.0051* 
(-5.1831) 
[-0.0007] 
-0 .0141* 
(-3.1289) 
 [-0.0015] 
- 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Notes: In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding z-statistics. In the square brackets, the associated 
marginal effects are given.* and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively 
Count R2 is the proportion of outcomes correctly predicted by the model 
XX denotes trigger country and YY receiver country in the pair-wise causal relationship  
 
 
 
Variables 
All  
Countries 
Peripheral  
Countries 
Peripheral- 
Central 
Countries   
Central 
Countries    
Central-
Peripheral  
countries   
 
 
 
Regional 
market 
sentiment 
 
Credit Spread 
 
EURCreditSpread - 0.6913* 
(8.1606) 
[0.0579] 
- 1.4389* 
(3.9986) 
[0.1529] 
 
 
ITRAXXFIN 
 
EURITRAXXFIN  - 0.0330* 
(2.8964) 
 [0.0043] 
  
ITRAXXNF 
 
EURITRAXXNF  - - 0.0813* 
(3.5812) 
[0.0086] 
0.0330* 
(3.6213) 
 [0.0176] 
Euro Instability EURInstability 11.4764* 
(3.5111) 
 [2.1858] 
63.1799* 
(5.4212) 
 [5.2950] 
126.4706* 
(3.8005) 
 [1.6343] 
27.2055* 
(2.8994) 
[0.2891] 
 
 
6.9165* 
(3.5821) 
[0.7980] 
Financial  
Linkages 
Cross-border 
banking linkages 
XXYYBAN 0.0194* 
(3.8213) 
[0.0037] 
 
- 0.0147* 
(3.6934) 
[0.0017] 
- - 
Individual dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Time dummies NO NO YES YES NO 
Pseudo R2 0.3577 0.3750 0.4096 0.3535 0.4096 
Count R2 0.6754 0.7779 0.7448 0.7676 0.6552 
Log likelihood -685.6621 -297.7433 -115.2336 -687.4604 -115.2336 
χ2 197.20* 169.49* 64.16* 246.71* 64.16* 
Prob individual dummies = 0 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Prob time dummies = 0 0.8632 0.6700 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.8111 
Prob individual dummies  
and time dummies = 0 
- 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Observations 1226 925 290 287 290 
Country pairs 90 20 25 20 25 
